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Zoning-DISCRIMINATORY INTENT MUST BE PROVED BEFORE COURTS
MAY REACH FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION
ISSUES-Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing De-
velopment Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
The Village of Arlington Heights, a suburb located about twenty-
six miles northwest of Chicago, Illinois, has had a comprehensive
land use plan in effect since 1959.' The plan divides Arlington
Heights into three basic areas: 1) a central, single-family residential
area, 2) a "buffer-zone," and 3) a commercial and industrial area.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation (hereinafter
MHDC)2 contracted with the Clerics of St. Viator, a Catholic reli-
gious order, to buy fifteen acres of land within the single-family
residential area of the Village3 where MHDC proposed to build a
public housing development, to be called Lincoln Green, for low-to-
moderate income families.4 This development would be the only
subsidized housing in the Village.5 Because the majority of the eligi-
ble tenants for Lincoln Green were black and the Village's popula-
tion was almost entirely white,8 Lincoln Green would most likely
raise the minority population of the Village over a thousand per-
cent.7
MHDC, through the appropriate channels, applied to the Village
for a zoning change for the fifteen acres from single-family to multi-
family.8 The Village refused to grant the change, basing its refusal
on the grounds that it wanted to preserve the property values of the
surrounding single family homes, and that it wanted to maintain
1. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.
1975), rev'd & remanded, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
2. "Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation is an Illinois non-profit corporation
organized in 1968 for the purpose of developing low and moderate income housing in the
Chicago metropolitan area." 517 F.2d at 410-11.
3. The price was $300,000 for a 99-year lease and sale agreement. Id. at 411.
4. Lincoln Green was to be a 1900-unit townhouse development. The townhouses would
not differ significantly in appearance from the surrounding single-family dwellings. Id. at 411,
415.
5. Id. at 411.
6. The population of Arlington Heights in 1970 was 64,884 people, but only 27 residents
were black. "According to statistics of plaintiffs' [MHDC's] expert, demographer and urban-
ologist Pierre de Vise, Arlington Heights is the most residentially segregated community in
the Chicago metropolitan area among municipalities with more than 50,000 residents." Id.
at 413-14 n.1.
7. Id. at 414.
8. MHDC alleged that the Village had arbitrarily granted zoning variances to commercial
developers in violation of its own "buffer zone" policy. The court of appeals, however, ac-
cepted the Village's evidence that only four out of 60 zoning change applications had been
granted in "clear violation of the 'buffer zone' policy .... " Id. at 412.
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the integrity of its comprehensive plan.' The Village stated that
these grounds for refusal were compelling reasons for not granting
the zoning variance. 0
MHDC and individual plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the re-
fusal to rezone perpetuated racial segregation in the Village" and
denied MHDC the right to use its property in a "reasonable man-
ner" in violation of the fourteenth amendment," the Civil Rights
Act of 1866,'1 the Civil Rights Act of 1971,14 and the Fair Housing
Act of 1968.'1 The federal district court held that the Village's deci-
sion not to rezone did not have a racially discriminatory effect and
that there were "good faith reasons" for the Village's decision." The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and
held that since the Village had shown no compelling public inter-
ests, its refusal to grant the zoning change constituted a violation
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 7
The court of appeals discarded MHDC's contention that the Vil-
lage was administering its zoning policy in a discriminatory man-
ner.'" The evidence showed that the Village was applying its buffer
zone policy, though not with absolute consistency. The court said
that the Village's refusal to rezone was not discriminatory for equal
protection purposes merely because the refusal affected more blacks
9. The Village's witness asserted that the property values of the surrounding single-family
dwellings might decrease by as much as 5-10%. Id. at 415.
10. The circuit court held that the Village's decision not to rezone had racially discrimina-
tory effects and could be upheld only upon a showing of a compelling public interest. Id.
11. Id. at 411.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides in relevant part: "nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
1-3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind,
and to no other.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured . . ..
15. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970) states: "It is the policy of the United States to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States."
16. 373 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Il. 1974).
17. 517 F.2d at 415.
18. Id. at 412.
19. Id.
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than whites. 0 The Village's action was aimed at the low income
housing project, not at a specific race, and so was insufficient to
invoke the strict scrutiny standard of review.2 But the court also
said that the Village's refusal to rezone" 'must be assessed not only
in its immediate objective but its historical context and ultimate
effect.' "2
The Chicago metropolitan area, and especially the Village, had a
history of segregated housing.Y The court emphasized that the per-
centage of blacks in the Village between 1960 and 1970 decreased,
while the percentage of blacks in the Chicago metropolitan area had
increased by four percent during the same period.24 The court fo-
cused on the fact that instead of helping to reverse this trend of
segregation, the Village had been "exploiting the problem" by ig-
noring it.25 Because of the Village's exploitation of its segregated
character, the court of appeals applied the strict scrutiny standard
of constitutional review and held that the Village's refusal to rezone
had racially discriminatory effects and was a violation of fourteenth
amendment equal protection rights.28
On January 11, 1977, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the Seventh Circuit on the constitutional issues and remanded the
case for further consideration of the statutory issues.2 7 First, the
Court considered the issue of standing, holding that the plaintiffs
had standing to assert their respective rights.28 Secondly, the Court
held that "[piroof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is
required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."12 ' The
Court listed "evidentiary sources" and "subjects of proper inquiry"
for determining whether a racially discriminatory purpose exists in
a particular case.30 Thirdly, the Court found the evidence in
20. Id. at 413.
21. Id. The court stated: "Governmental action having a disproportionate impact on a
class composed of an extremely high percentage of racial minorities might be classified as
discriminatory in an equal protection sense. But that is not this case." Id.
22. Id., citing Kennedy'Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 112 (2d
Cir. 1970).
23. 517 F.2d at 413-14.
24. Id. at 414.
25. Id. at 414-15.
26. Id. at 415.
27. 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). The Court agreed 7-1 on standing and the legal criteria (parts I-
III of the opinion), but Justices White, Marshall, and Brennan would have remanded on the
constitutional issues as well. Justice White thought the bulk of the decision unnecessary.
28. Id. at 561-63.
29. Id. at 563.
30. Id. at 564-65. Indicators of racially discriminatory intent would be the actions of
officials and official organizations prior to the refusal to rezone. If the officials voiced preju-
dices against the excluded race at official meetings, or if the official organizations had a
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Arlington Heights insufficient to show a racially discriminatory in-
tent and so applied only the rational basis standard of review. The
Court implied that it would invoke the strict scrutiny standard of
review only in cases where there was proof of a racially discrimina-
tory purpose.3 Applying the rational basis standard, the Court held
that because MHDC had failed to prove a discriminatory intent on
the part of the Village, the discriminatory effect of the Village's
decision was inconsequential and did not constitute a violation of
fourteenth amendment equal protection.32 The Court did not dis-
cuss the statutory issue of whether the refusal to rezone violated the
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, but rather remanded that ques-
tion for further consideration.
history of passing discriminatory ordinances, proof of discriminatory intent could be found
in records of meetings and of the decisionmaking organizations.
The Court pointed out that if the property at issue had always been zoned for multi-family
use but was changed to single-family use when MHDC's plans to construct integrated low-
and middle-income housing became known to the Village, it would not be difficult to prove
discriminatory intent. But since the property at issue had always been zoned for single-family
use, evidence of discriminatory intent was lacking. Id.
31. Id. at 563.
[I]t is because legislators and administrators are properly concerned with balanc-
ing numerous competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing the mer-
its of their decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality. But racial
discrimination is not just another competing consideration. When there is proof
that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this
judicial deference is no longer justified.
Id. (footnote omitted).
32. Id. at 566. The Court also stated that proof of a racially discriminatory purpose would
not necessarily have invalidated the Village's refusal to rezone; such proof would merely have
shifted to the Village the burden of proving that it would have refused to rezone even absent
any discriminatory purpose. Id. at 566 n.21.
Justice White dissented, arguing that the case should have been remanded to the court of
appeals for further consideration of the constitutional and statutory issues. Justice White felt
that it was improper for the Court to reverse the judgment, after a reexamination of the
evidence supporting the findings of fact below, on the basis of an intervening decision. The
intervening decision was Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), which was decided subse-
quent to the court of appeals' decision finding a fourteenth amendment violation in Arlington
Heights. Justice White found it particularly inappropriate for the Court to reexamine the
evidence in the case in light of the legal standards announced in the instant case and in Davis.
The proper ruling, suggested Justice White, would be to vacate the judgment below and
remand the case in order to permit the court of appeals to reconsider its ruling in light of the
intervening decision.
Justice White also felt that the Court should not have listed "evidentiary sources" or
"subjects of proper inquiry" to be used in determining whether a racially discriminatory
purpose or intent existed. Because the court of appeals accepted the district court's finding
that the Village's decision was not motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose, White
argued that it was unnecessary for the Court to discuss the standard for proving the racially
discriminatory purpose required by Davis for a fourteenth amendment violation. 97 S. Ct. at
567.
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I. STANDING
In Baker v. Carr,33 the United States Supreme Court stated the
gist of the question of standing: "Have the appellants alleged such
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the Court so largely depends for illumination of difficult con-
stitutional questions?"' ' Economic injuries have long been sufficient
injuries upon which to base standing. 5 In Sierra Club v. Morton,3
however, the Court enlarged the class of cognizable injuries to in-
clude aesthetic and environmental harm. In Sierra Club, although
the plaintiffs did not allege a personal stake in the outcome suffi-
cient to confer standing, the Court said: "We do not question that
this type of [environmental] harm may amount to an 'injury in
fact' sufficient to lay the basis for standing . . . . But the 'injury
in fact' test requires that the party seeking review be himself among
the injured.""
In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Pro-
cedures (SCRAP),38 another case involving environmental issues,
the Court expanded further the class of persons having standing to
sue. The SCRAP Court stated that if the plaintiff himself were
injured, he would have standing; the fact that the plaintiff was one
of many persons similarly injured would not preclude him from
bringing suit.39 But the Court did not eliminate the "injury in fact"
33. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). This case involved voters claiming a violation of their fourteenth
amendment rights because the Tennessee legislature was malapportioned. The Court held
that voters residing in counties which were unfavorably apportioned had standing to sue
because they were voters who alleged facts showing disadvantage to themselves as individu-
als. Id. at 206.
34. Id. at 204. The question posed in Baker was used as a test for standing in cases
involving economic and social well-being. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973);
Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
35. See Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 7 (1967); Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.
Fe Ry., 357 U.S. 77, 83 (1958); F.C.C. v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477
(1940).
36. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
37. Id. at 734-35. The Sierra Club failed to establish standing because it did not allege
that any of its members specifically were injured.
38. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
39. Id. at 686-87. SCRAP was an association of five law students who sued to suspend the
application of a railroad freight surcharge until the submission of an environmental impact
statement in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c). SCRAP alleged that the surcharge would have an adverse effect on
recycling materials and thus significantly affect the environment. Each member of SCRAP
alleged in part that the harm to the environment would harm him personally because he used
the mountains and lakes for camping and fishing. The Court held that the members of
SCRAP had standing because they alleged harm to themselves, even though all persons who
utilize the natural environment would suffer the same harm.
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requirement."
Both Sierra Club and SCRAP involved Section 10 of the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which provides that any per-
son suffering a legal wrong or adversely affected by an agency action
is entitled to judicial review of that action." Arguably, the standing
requirements under the APA are less stringent than standing re-
quirements in the traditional case or controversy. But the Supreme
Court continues to cite Sierra Club and SCRAP in many cases not
involving the APA. 2
In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 3 the
"injury in fact" requirement was restated. In that case, the Reserv-
ists brought suit on behalf of all taxpayers and citizens of the United
States who were injured by government officials' actions in violation
of the incompatibility clause of the Constitution." The Court held
the Reservists had no standing to sue on behalf of taxpayers or
citizens because they did not allege any special injury to themselves.
The Court said: "Only concrete injury presents the factual context
within which a court, aided by parties who argue within the context,
is capable of making decisions."'"
Finally, in the landmark case of Warth v. Seldin,0 the Court
stated its criterion for standing in cases involving zoning. Eight
individual plaintiffs and several organizations brought suit against
the Town of Penfield and its officials. These plaintiffs claimed to
represent "'all taxpayers of the City of Rochester, all low and
moderate income persons residing in the City of Rochester, all
black and/or Puerto Rican/Spanish citizens residing in the City of
Rochester and all persons employed but excluded from living in
the Town of Penfield who are affected or may in the future be
affected by the defendants' policies and practices . . . . "'I The
plaintiffs claimed generally that a zoning ordinance of the Town of
Penfield, "by its terms and as enforced by the defendant board
members, effectively excluded persons of low and moderate income
40. Id. at 688-89. See also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
42. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975); United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
43. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
44. Art. I, § 6, cl. 2 of the Constitution provides that "no person holding any Office under
the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office."
45. 418 U.S. at 221.
46. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). Worth was a 5-4 decision, with Justices Douglas, Brennan, White,
and Marshall dissenting.
47. Id. at 493-94 n.1.
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from living in the town in contravention of the plaintiffs' First,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. ... ,4Although the
individual plaintiffs alleged that the zoning practices being enforced
by the Town of Penfield against builders and developers had caused
the lack of affordable housing within the town, none of the individu-
als had any present interest in living in Penfield or purchasing prop-
erty there.
The Warth plaintiff organizations, Housing Council in the Mon-
roe County Area, Inc., and Rochester Home Builders Association,
Inc., alleged that the zoning policies of the Town of Penfield had
prevented their members from building housing for low and moder-
ate income persons in Penfield. None of the builder and developer
members of these organizations had plans to build such housing in
Penfield, however, and, with one exception," none had ever been
denied a zoning permit or variance.
The Second Circuit held that none of the plaintiffs had standing.
Affirming the court of appeals' decision, the Supreme Court said:
"We hold only that a plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary
zoning practices must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating
that the challenged practices harm him, and that he personally
would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention."50
48. Id. at 493.
49. Id. One developer, Penfield Better Homes Corp., had been denied a zoning variance
for construction of moderate income housing in Penfield in 1969, but when the complaint was
filed in 1972, Penfield failed to allege that the proposed housing project remained viable. Id.
at 516-17.
50. Id. at 508 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). The Court distinguished opposing
leading cases from the situation in Worth on the grounds that in the other cases "the plaintiffs
challenged zoning restrictions as applied to particular projects that would supply housing
within their means, and of which they were intended residents," while the petitioners in
Warth relied on "little more than the remote possibility ... that their situation might have
been better had respondents acted otherwise." Warth was cited as controlling in the 1976 case
of Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976), which-although not a
zoning case-dealt with discrimination against indigent persons and with the Administrative
Procedure Act. This case involved Revenue Ruling 69-545 of the Internal Revenue Service,
which gave tax-exempt status to hospitals that made certain of their facilities open to indi-
gent persons. Plaintiffs, a group of unincorporated associations, nonprofit corporations, and
indigent persons, filed suit against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue alleging that the preferred tax status of these hospitals encouraged discrimi-
nation against the poor in hospital facilities. The Court held that the plaintiffs had no
standing because the injuries they alleged-inaccessibility of hospitals to them-was not
caused by the defendants, but by a third party, the hospital. The plaintiffs alleged that
Revenue Ruling 69-545 encouraged discrimination against the poor because it allowed hospi-
tals to obtain a tax-exempt status simply by providing emergency care to the poor. Such
hospitals could deny regular medical care to indigent persons and still retain their tax-exempt
status.
"In sum, when a plaintiffs standing is brought into issue the relevant inquiry is whether,
assuming justiciability of the claim, the plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is likely
to be redressed by a favorable decision." Id. at 38.
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Neither the individual plaintiffs nor the plaintiff organizations in
Warth fulfilled these standing requirements.
Arlington Heights also involved individual plaintiffs and plaintiff
organizations. Citing Warth and Baker as controlling, the Court in
Arlington Heights conferred standing on the plaintiff organization,
MHDC, and an individual plaintiff, a black person eligible for low
income housing in the Village. MHDC had standing to assert its
own "right to be free of arbitrary or irrational zoning actions."'" The
individual plaintiff had standing to assert his right to be free of
racial discrimination. 52 The Court left open the question of whether
MHDC could have asserted the rights of prospective minority ten-
ants to be free of racial discrimination because the one individual
plaintiff had standing to assert those rights as his own."
MHDC, unlike the plaintiff organizations in Warth, alleged spe-
cific injury to itself which could be remedied by a favorable determi-
nation. The plaintiff organizations in Warth had no specific plans
for construction of low or middle income housing. They simply al-
leged that the Penfield zoning decisions denied them the opportun-
ity to build such housing. MHDC had spent thousands of dollars on
plans for a specific low and moderate income housing project, Lin-
coln Green, to be built in the Village. MHDC had contracted for the
land upon which to build Lincoln Green, and was ready to begin
construction as soon as rezoning could be obtained. The Village's
refusal to rezone was an effective barrier to MHDC's construction
of Lincoln Green, and would result in MHDC's loss of the money
expended on planning. A zoning change would not guarantee that
Lincoln Green would be built, since financing and federal project
approvals were needed. However, a favorable decision (an injunc-
tion against the Village) would remove the absolute barrier created
against Lincoln Green by the Village. 4 Unlike the plaintiff organiza-
tions in Warth, MHDC was granted standing. MHDC was not
granted standing because it had been denied the opportunity to
build, but because it had alleged a sufficient economic and non-
economic injury as a result of being denied the opportunity to
build.55
It is important to note that MHDC was found to have standing
for two independent reasons. First, MHDC had shown economic
injury by reason of the funds expended in planning Lincoln Green.
51. 97 S. Ct. at 562.
52. Id. at 562-63.
53. Id. at 562.
54. Id. at 561.
55. Id. at 561-62.
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Additionally, however, the Court ruled that MHDC had shown suf-
ficient non-economic injury to establish standing.
MHDC is a nonprofit corporation. Its interest in building Lincoln
Green stems not from a desire for economic gain, but rather from
an interest in making suitable low-cost housing available in areas
where such housing is scarce. This is not mere abstract concern
about a problem of general interest."
Thus, where a nonprofit corporation of this type pursues a specific
project proposal, there apparently need not be a substantial outlay
of funds to satisfy the economic injury test for standing. Arlington
Heights suggests an alternative theory of non-economic in-
jury-provided there is a specific project at stake.
The individual plaintiff in Arlington Heights was granted stand-
ing because he alleged a specific injury to himself which could be
remedied by a favorable determination. The individual plaintiff,
Mr. Ransom, was a black man who worked in the Village but lived
twenty miles away. Mr. Ransom testified at trial that if Lincoln
Green were built, he would be eligible to live in Lincoln Green and
would want to do so. He alleged that because of the Village's exclu-
sionary zoning practices he had been unable to obtain housing in the
Village, and that a favorable decision would result in the probability
of Lincoln Green being built and therefore his obtaining housing in
the Village.57 Mr. Ransom's allegations met the Warth requirement
that plaintiffs challenging zoning restrictions challenge them "as
applied to particular projects that would supply housing within
their means, and of which they were intended residents." 58 Thus,
Mr. Ransom was able to demonstrate that unless relief from the
assertedly illegal actions of the Village was forthcoming, his imme-
diate and personal interests would be harmed. 9
A crucial factor in the Arlington Heights standing decision is that
a favorable decision in the case would not have guaranteed that
MHDC would build Lincoln Green or that the individual plaintiff,
Mr. Ransom, would obtain housing there if it were built. A favorable
decision and an injunction against the Village would merely remove
the barrier to Lincoln Green created by the Village's refusal to re-
56. Id. at 562.
57. Id. at 563.
58. 422 U.S. at 507.
59. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976): "When a
plaintiff's standing is brought into issue the relevant inquiry is whether, assuming justiciabil-
ity of the claim, the plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by
a favorable decision."
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zone. A favorable decision in Warth would also have removed the
barrier to low and moderate income housing in Penfield, but would
not have guaranteed that such housing would be built. Yet the
Arlington Heights plaintiffs were granted standing, while the Warth
plaintiffs were not. The distinction is that the Arlington Heights
plaintiffs had a specific housing project at stake, while the Warth
plaintiffs were alleging the general right to construct low and moder-
ate income housing. Under the Arlington Heights rationale, the
plaintiff must demonstrate a specific personal injury that is likely
to be redressed by a favorable decision."0
II. "EVIDENTIARY SOURCES" AND "SUBJECTS OF PROPER INQUIRY"
After the Court resolved the standing issue it turned to the merits
and stated the controlling principle:
Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976), made it clear that official action will not be held unconsti-
tutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate im-
pact. . . .Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is
required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."
The Court then listed various factors to be used when determining
whether a discriminatory intent or purpose exists in any particular
case.62 These factors may best be presented as questions: Is there a
pattern of discrimination caused by legislation which appears neu-
tral on its face? 3 Were the laws written in such a way as to affect
only one group in the population? Is there a series of events or
legislative actions which were taken to effect discrimination? Does
the law fall more heavily on one race than another? Is the law
difficult to explain on nonracial grounds? If the answer to any of
these questions is "yes," then under the principles enunciated in
Washington v. Davis, 61 there may be evidence of a racially discrimi-
natory intent or purpose.
Washington v. Davis involved a suit by black police officers
against city officials for the use of a verbal*ability test allegedly
60. 97 S. Ct. at 561.
61. Id. at 563.
62. Id. at 564, citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S.
268 (1939); Ginn & Beal v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886).
63. 97 S. Ct. at 564, citing Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Griffin v.
County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Dailey v. City
of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
64. 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
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"unlawfully discriminatory and thereby in violation of the due pro-
cess clause of the Fifth Amendment . . . ." The black officers
alleged that the test was discriminatory against blacks because a
higher proportion of blacks failed the test than did whites. The
Supreme Court held that in the absence of intent to discriminate,
the test would not be struck down. The Court noted, however, that
a racially discriminatory purpose need not appear on the face of a
law or statute," but may be "inferred from the totality of the rele-
vant facts . "67
The Court in Arlington Heights said that the holding in
Washington v. Davis "reaffirmed a principle well established in a
variety of contexts," and cited cases holding that a discriminatorypurpose must be proven." The Court conceded that "contrary indi-
cations" could be drawn from some of its cases; however, the Court
only mentioned these decisions in a footnote." The most prominent
of these cases is Palmer v. Thompson,70 where the City of Jackson,
Mississippi, when ordered by a court to integrate all public facili-
ties, integrated all facilities but closed its municipal swimming
pools to all citizens-black and white. Black citizens sued city offi-
cials alleging discriminatory motive and effect. The Court held that
the closing of the swimming pools to all citizens was not discrimina-
tory, regardless of the intent, because black and white citizens were
affected equally. "[N]o case in this Court has held that a legisla-
tive act may violate equal protection solely because of the motiva-
tion of the men who voted for it." 7'
The Court in Washington v. Davis distinguished Palmer v.
Thompson on the ground that the Palmer decision did not involve
"a statute or ordinance having neutral purposes but dispropor-
tionate racial consequences, 72 like the test at issue in Washington
v. Davis. The Palmer decision can be distinguished from Arlington
Heights because the latter involved an ordinance "having neutral
purposes but disproportionate racial consequences" as applied to
65. Id. at 234.
66. Id. at 241.
67. Id. at 242.
68. 97 S. Ct. at 563, citing Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945). See also City of Rich-
mond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
69. 97 S. Ct. at 563 n.10, citing Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451
(1972); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968). These cases hold that the Court will not strike otherwise valid legislation because of
the underlying intent or motivation.
70. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
71. Id. at 224.
72. 426 U.S. at 243.
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MHDC and its plans for the Lincoln Green Development.73 The
intent behind the ordinance was neutral, but the ordinance affected
more blacks than whites.
II. WASHINGTON V. DAVIS
The Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis admittedly reached
a conclusion contrary to those of an impressive list of prior court of
appeals decisions.7' These lower court cases essentially held "that
the substantially disproportionate racial impact of a statute or offi-
cial practice standing alone and without regard to discriminatory
purpose, suffices to prove racial discrimination violating the Equal
Protection Clause absent some justification going substantially be-
yond what would be necessary to validate most other legislative
classifications."7 5 Some of these contrary cases dealt with various
aspects of zoning.
The first of these cases, Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelop-
ment Agency,7 actually dealt with urban renewal. The minority
plaintiffs were displaced by an urban renewal project and alleged
that the defendants did not assure or attempt to assure relocation
for Negro and Puerto Rican displacees to the same extent that they
did for white displacees. The defendants replied that they had no
intent to discriminate; that the relocation of more whites than
Negroes or Puerto Ricans was purely the accidental result of a non-
discriminatory relocation plan. The court of appeals held that the
discriminatory effect of the relocation was sufficient to allege denial
of equal protection of the laws and to require the federal court to
consider the claim on its merits.77
Another contrary case was Kennedy Park Homes Association v.
City of Lackawanna.7 In this case, after Kennedy had planned the
construction of a proposed low income housing project, the Lacka-
wanna City Council adopted a moratorium on new subdivisions and
zoned certain acreage, including the proposed project's site, as open
space and park area, despite a contrary recommendation by the
73. See also Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 97 S. Ct. 568 (1977);
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
74. 426 U.S. at 244-45 n.12. "The cases impressively demonstrate that there is another
side to the issue; but, with all due respect, to the extent that those cases rested on or expressed
the view that proof of discriminatory racial purpose is unnecessary in making out an equal
protection violation, we are in disagreement." Id. at 244-45.
75. Id. at 244.
76. 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
77. The Second Circuit responded: "'Equal protection of the laws' means more than
merely the absence of governmental action designed to discriminate .... " Id. at 931.
78. 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
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City's planning expert. The City argued that the discriminatory
effects of its actions were not intentional, but the court of appeals
found that "racial motivation resulting in invidious discrimination
guided the actions of the City."7 But the court also stated: "Even
were we to accept the City's allegation that any discrimination here
resulted from thoughtlessness rather than a purposeful scheme, the
City may not escape responsibility for placing its black citizens
under a severe disadvantage which it cannot justify." s This result
in Kennedy Park Homes Association was cited by the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Gautreaux v. Romney,"1 where the court noted: "Courts have
held that alleged good faith is no more of a defense to segregation
in public housing than it is to segregation in public schools.""2
Finally, the court in Washington v. Davis cited two Fifth Circuit
cases which reaffirmed the trend in the courts of appeals to disre-
gard discriminatory intent where a discriminatory effect results.
First, in Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 3 the Town had provided ade-
quate public services-paved streets, effective drainage, sewage fa-
cilities, and good lighting-to the white sections of town but not to
the black sections. The Town argued that this allocation of munici-
pal facilities was not the result of a racially discriminatory intent.
The court disagreed:
In a civil rights suit alleging racial discrimination in contravention
of the Fourteenth Amendment, actual intent or motive need not
be directly proved, for:
' "equal protection of the laws" means more than merely the
absence of governmental action designed to discriminate;
• . .we now firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of
thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private
rights and the public interest as the perversity of a willful
scheme.' ...
Having determined that no compelling state interests can possibly
justify the discriminatory results of Shaw's administration of mu-
nicipal services, we conclude that a violation of equal protection
has occurred.u
79. Id. at 109.
80. Id. at 114.
81. 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971).
82. Id. at 738. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 765 (1963), in which
the Supreme Court stated: "It is of no consolation to an individual denied the equal protec-
tion of the laws that it was done in good faith."
83. 437 F.2d 1286(5th Cir. 1971), affd on rehearing en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972).
84. Id. at 1291-92 (citations omitted).
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In the second Fifth Circuit decision, Crow v. Brown,85 the court
stated:
[Ilt is abundantly clear that, in the absence of supervening ne-
cessity, any [government] action or inaction intended to perpetu-
ate or which in effect does perpetuate the conditions just described
[racial segregation] cannot stand."8
The Court in Washington v. Davis did not distinguish the con-
trary cases individually or otherwise, although it did acknowledge
that there was "another side to the issue."" Instead the Court cited
several of its own decisions which were in line with its holding."8 The
Court simply dismissed the contrary holdings by stating that it
disagreed with the cases cited to the extent that any of those cases
expressed the view that racially discriminatory purpose was not
necessary to show an equal protection violation. 9 With one sen-
tence, the Court in Washington v. Davis overruled decisions of
courts of appeals representing a large portion of the United States.
IV. Washington v. Davis As APPLIED TO Arlington Heights
In Washington v. Davis the Supreme Court stated:
The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discrimi-
nating on the basis of race. It is also true that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection com-
ponent prohibiting the United States from invidiously discriminat-
ing between individuals or groups. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954). But our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law
or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially
discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a
racially disproportionate impact."°
However, the Washington Court also noted that a racially dis-
criminatory purpose need not appear on the face of a law or statute,
85. 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), affd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
86. Id. at 392 (emphasis added).
87. 426 U.S. at 244-45.
88. Id. at 240-41, citing Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); James v. Val-
tierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 395 (1969); Wright v. Rockefeller, 396 U.S. 52 (1964); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282
(1950); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945).
89. 426 U.S. at 245.
90. Id. at 239 (emphasis added).
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but may be "inferred from the totality of the relevant facts ....
The relevant facts in Arlington Heights, as found by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals and adopted by the Supreme Court, were:
that Lincoln Green would have been the only low and moderate
income housing in the Village, "despite a great demand for such
housing in that area";92 Lincoln Green would have consisted of
townhouses and sixty percent open green space (it would not have
detracted from the aesthetic appearance of the surrounding single
family dwellings); MHDC made various changes in its Lincoln
Green proposal to try to satisfy the Village Plan Commission; Lin-
coln Green would make a net contribution to the Village's taxes;93
no other economically feasible site was available to MHDC; Lincoln
Green would have increased the Village's minority population by
over one thousand percent; and the Village's refusal to rezone per-
petuated the Village's segregated character by preventing construc-
tion of low and middle income housing in the Village. 4 The totality
of these facts raises a strong inference of racially discriminatory
purpose.
The Arlington Heights Court found that the impact of the Vil-
lage's decision not to rezone did "arguably bear more heavily on
racial minorities."95 But the Court dismissed this observation by
focusing on zoning facts other than those listed above. The Court
emphasized that the proposed site for Lincoln Green had always
been zoned for single-family dwellings, and that neighboring prop-
erty owners had relied on the maintenance of single-family zoning
in the vicinity. The Court also found that the Village's refusal to
rezone was a legitimate method of maintaining the Village's charac-
ter through its affirmative zoning practices and policies. Based on
these facts, the Court concluded that MHDC and the individual
plaintiffs had failed to prove that discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor in the Village's refusal to rezone."
V. FAIR HOUSING ACT CLAIMS
The Supreme Court remanded MHDC's claims under the Fair
Housing Act of 196811 because the court of appeals, "proceeding in
91. Id. at 242.
92. 517 F.2d at 411.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 414.
95. 97 S. Ct. at 565.
96. Id. at 565-66.
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1970). MHDC alleged the village violated §§ 3604(a) and
3617. 97 S. Ct. at 566.
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a somewhat unorthodox fashion," did not address itself to these
claims. 8 Upon remand, the Seventh Circuit held that under some
circumstances a showing of discriminatory effect is sufficient to
show a Fair Housing Act violation without a showing of discrimina-
tory intent." The court of appeals further held that if there were no
other land available to MHDC which was "properly zoned and suit-
able" for the construction of Lincoln Green, the Village, by refusing
to rezone, was guilty of a Fair Housing Act violation.' The court
of appeals remanded the case to the district court for a factual
determination of the availability of such land and instructed the
district court to place the burden of proving the existence of an
alternative site on the Village."'0
VI. CONCLUSION
The effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Arlington Heights
is that in cases of alleged zoning discrimination brought in federal
courts, discriminatory intent must be proved before courts can
reach fourteenth amendment equal protection issues. This decision
affects two different and opposing groups. The first group is made
up of planners, city and county officials, and residents of estab-
lished communities with anti-growth attitudes. The second group
consists of minority and low to middle income persons.
In the first group, it appears that governmental bodies will be able
to maintain the integrity of their zoning plans and residents will be
able to preserve their property values and the aesthetics of their
communities. Communities like the Village which traditionally
have been exclusively white, upper-class communities may remain
98. Id.
99. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977). The court listed four factors to be used to determine
under what circumstances conduct that produces a discriminatory impact will violate the
Fair Housing Act. Those factors are:
(1) how strong is the plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect;
(2) is there some evidence of discriminatory intent, though not enough to satisfy
the constitutional standard of Washington v. Davis;
(3) what is the defendant's interest in taking the action complained of; and
(4) does the plaintiff seek to compel the defendant to affirmatively provide housing
for members of minority groups or merely to restrain the defendant from interfering
with individual property owners who wish to provide such housing.
Id. at 1290.
100. Id. at 1294.
101. Id. at 1295. In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Fairchild stated that if no other
suitable site was available to MHDC, the Village's refusal to rezone was a violation of the
Fair Housing Act. Chief Judge Fairchild also asserted, however, that the burden of proving
the existence or non-existence of an alternative site should be on the plaintiff, MHDC, rather
than on the Village.
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so. By refusing to change preexisting zoning plans, communities,
cities, and other governmental entities may promote their
"unintentional" exclusionary natures. Theoretically, any com-
munity in the United States may thus exclude any person or group
of persons so long as no intent to discriminate is proved.
The advantages of the first group work to the detriment of the
second group. Low and middle income persons will be unable to
obtain housing in exclusive neighborhoods because of preexisting
zoning laws and comprehensive plans. Minority persons will con-
tinue to be excluded from all or predominantly white neighborhoods
because the neighborhoods have become white "unintentionally."
Developers who so desire will be unable to provide housing for low
income and minority tenants for the same reasons.
There is a need for controlling the growth of cities through manag-
ing and planning; but the controlled growth of cities should not
occur at the expense of low income and minority persons. A balance
must be struck between managing the growth and providing ade-
quate housing in a nondiscriminatory manner. The Court failed to
reach a proper balance in Arlington Heights. The result of this deci-
sion is that under constitutional law, communities may discrimi-
nate against minority and low-income persons so long as they dis-
criminate subtly.
It is evident after the Supreme Court's decision in Arlington
Heights that plaintiffs must turn to other theories and other forums
for solutions to their housing problems. The Arlington Heights
plaintiffs may still redeem their rights on Fair Housing Act grounds,
but similar plaintiffs perhaps would be better situated to choose
state tribunals for prosecution of the same or similar claims. The
New Jersey Supreme Court has placed on municipalities the affirm-
ative duty to provide nondiscriminatory low-cost housing.'"' The
102. Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713
(N.J.), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
It is plain beyond dispute that proper provision for adequate housing of all catego-
ries of people is certainly an absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare
required in all local land use regulation. Further the universal and constant need
for such housing is so important and of such broad public interest that the general
welfare which developing municipalities like Mount Laurel must consider extends
beyond their boundaries and cannot be parochially confined to the claimed good
of the particular municipality. It has to follow that, broadly speaking, the presump-
tive obligation arises for each municipality affirmatively to plan and provide, by
its land use regulations, the reasonable opportunity for an appropriate variety and
choice of housing, including, of course, low and moderate cost housing, to meet the
needs, desires and resources of all categories of people who may desire to live within
its boundaries. Negatively, it may not adopt regulations or policies which thwart
or preclude that opportunity.
Id. at 727-28.
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Florida Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975
calls for "[t]he provision of adequate sites for future housing, in-
cluding housing for low- and moderate-income families . . .,.
Because state courts and legislative bodies are more closely in con-
tact with the problems of urban housing than are the federal courts,
they might afford the best and most equitable solutions to Arlington
Heights problems. Ideally, the Fair Housing Act and state land
planning innovations should help plaintiffs such as those in Arling-
ton Heights to obtain the national goal of "fair housing throughout
the United States.' 10 4
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104. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970).
